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Abstract
Bealer, in a 2004 paper, presents an argument that he takes to be a
reductio of what he argues to be the most favourable interpretation
of identity sentences available to direct reference theory. We argue
that his argument fails. If the dummy mode-of-presentation operator
Bealer introduces induces extensional contexts then the argument is
a trivially valid reductio, since its only premise is identical to the
conclusion. But it is untenable that the operator should be exten-
sional. If the operator is intensional then the argument comes out
invalid, and so there is no reductio. Either way, the advocates of di-
rect reference theory are at liberty to reject Bealer’s interpretation,
since it is self-contradictory.
Introduction
In (2004) Bealer presents an argument that he takes to be a reductio of what
he considers the most favourable interpretation of identity sentences avail-
able to direct reference theory. In this paper we wish to show why Bealer’s
argument is not quite the confutation he assumes it to be of how direct ref-
erence theory interprets identity sentences. Our critique of Bealer’s argu-
ment should not be taken to be an indirect defence of direct reference theory,
though. In fact, we agree that none of the several other interpretations of
identity sentences Bealer attributes tentatively to direct reference theory is
convincing.
Our objection to Bealer’s argument is twofold. The rst objection is this.
Taken one way, the argument qualies as a valid reductio, though one that
contains a premise that the proponents of direct reference theory are free
to reject as an adequate interpretation of their stance on identity sentences.
Bealer’s interpretation is presented as being a ‘quite natural’ (id., p. 590)
way of spelling out the allegedly literal truth allegedly conveyed by a literal
falsehood. But this ‘quite natural’ way is only make-believe, for it is itself a
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falsehood (because an inconsistency), hence cannot be the literal truth that is
supposed to be made explicit (and so is far from being a ‘quite natural’ inter-
pretation). Nobody, however, should be expected to accept a false (let alone
inconsistent) proposition as an adequate interpretation of their position.
The notation Bealer deploys when formulating his reductio makes it seem
as though there were substantial (i.e., propositional) differences where there
are, in fact, only notational (i.e., sentential) ones. The trick of the reductio
is namely that the notation of the premise representing the interpretation is
designed to conceal the inconsistency that is evident from the notation of the
conclusion. Had the notation in which the conclusion is couched been used
in both places, it would have been obvious (a) that the conclusion is identical
to one of the premises, (b) that the reductio is, therefore, trivially valid, and
(c) that the relevant premise is inconsistent.
Therefore, Bealer’s dialectic task is to make the proposition when occurring
as premise appear attractive enough for the friends of direct reference to re-
gard it as true, while in fact it is false. But the intended reductio of direct
reference theory (as far as identity sentences go) fails as soon as the premise
is, rightly, rejected as being false. The reductio fails not because it is log-
ically awed (for it is not), but because it is philosophically irrelevant to
whatever may be the (best) direct-reference analysis of identity sentences.
The second objection is this. If the dummy mode-of-presentation operator
Bealer introduces as part of the ‘quite natural’ interpretation induces ref-
erentially transparent contexts then the argument is a trivially valid reduc-
tio, since an inconsistent proposition is being substituted for itself. In case
this is Bealer’s argument then the rst objection kicks in. Yet it is hard to
believe that the operator would induce transparent contexts, for modes of
presentation are obviously not extensional entities. If the operator induces
referentially opaque contexts then the argument comes out invalid, and so
there is no reductio. Bealer barely argues for the extensionality of the op-
erator. The argument he does offer trades on running the semantic issue of
the reference relation of directly referring terms together with the issue of
the transparency or opacity of contexts. Though related, one issue is how
and what supposedly directly referring terms refer to, another issue is what
substitutions in what contexts go through and which do not. We sketch two
notions of opacity. One notion is a logical one to do with co-referential terms
not being validly substitutable in opaque contexts. The other is a pragmatic
or epistemological one to do with a competent language-user rationally fail-
ing to assent to substitution of co-referential terms without loss of linguistic
competence. We argue that the latter notion is the one needed for Bealer’s
reductio.
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However, whether extensional/transparency-generating or intensional/opac-
ity-generating, mode-of-presentation operators do not sit well with operands
boasting directly referring terms. Despite Kaplan permitting the reference
relation of directly referring terms to be mediated by modes of presentation
(which must be of a non-Fregean kind, though), the latter are not part of
the syntax or semantics of the former. Their semantics reduces to terms ‘di-
rectly’ picking out objects, with no mention of mediating entities in their
syntax.1 Says Kaplan:
The semantical feature that I wish to highlight in calling an expres-
sion directly referential is not the fact that it designates the same
object in every circumstance, but the way in which it designates an
object in any circumstance. Such an expression is a device of direct
reference. This does not imply that it has no conventionally xed
semantical rules which determine its referent in each context of use;
quite the opposite. There are semantical rules which determine the
referent in each context of use  but that is all. The rules do not
provide a complex which together with a circumstance of evaluation
yields an object. They just provide an object.
(1989, p. 495.)
Yet Bealer’s mode-of-presentation operator gures explicitly in the syntax.
So, again, the proponents of direct reference theory would be entitled to
maintain that Bealer’s interpretation of how their theory accounts for iden-
tity sentences involving directly referring terms is irrelevant to their actual
theory.
In the following we rst present Bealer’s reductio and then spell out our two
objections in more detail, concluding that Bealer does not have much of a
case, if indeed any, against how direct reference theory construes identity
sentences.
1. Bealer’s Reductio
Assume that in today’s astronomy class you learnt that Hesperus is Phospho-
rus. Your notes contain the entry
Hesperus = Phosphorus (*)
1 See Martí (1995) for a discussion of various notions of direct reference.
05jespersen_zouhar
2011/12/6
page 490
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
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Enter direct reference theory. It holds that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are
two Kripke-style proper names that refer to one and the same individual:
Venus. The theory also holds that the sentence (*) expresses a Russell-style
singular proposition, the constituents of which are one occurrence of the
identity relation and two occurrences of Venus alias Phosphorus alias Hes-
perus.
It remains an open question exactly what singular propositions are and how
to model them in accordance with direct reference theory. Even if we join
direct reference theory in representing singular propositions as (though per-
haps without identifying them with) ordered n-tuples, it is not obvious ex-
actly what are their elements or what is the order among them (id., p. 584).
This need not detain us here, though, so let us just assume that there is a
singular proposition expressed by (*), consisting of the identity relation and
two occurrences of the same individual. The individual bears at least three
different names, ‘Venus’, ‘Phosphorus’, and ‘Hesperus’. If singular proposi-
tions are represented as/identied with ordered n-tuples, the following eight
formulae name or express the same singular proposition:
<=, Venus, Venus>
<=, Phosphorus, Phosphorus>
<=, Hesperus, Hesperus>
<=, Venus, Phosphorus>
<=, Venus, Hesperus>
<=, Hesperus, Phosphorus>
<=, Hesperus, Venus>
<=, Phosphorus, Venus>.
Since the three names co-denote the object o and the sign ‘=’ denotes =
(i.e., the relation of identity between individuals), we identify the relevant
singular proposition with (**):
<=, o, o > (**).
Bealer then raises the question:
How, if a = b, can the proposition that a = a and the proposition
that a = b be different? (Id., p. 575.)
Well, they just cannot, if a = a and a = b are the proposition that a is self-
identical. (Remember that the proposition that a = a, the proposition that
a = b, the proposition that a is self-identical and the proposition that b
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is self-identical are but four names of the same proposition: they are not
the proposition itself.) Yet what you learnt in astronomy class was certainly
not that Venus, under whatever name or none, is self-identical. So (**) can-
not be the right proposition to be matched off with (*). Yet the matching of
(*) with (**) is entailed by the adoption of Kripkean names and Russellian
propositions. As Russell observed long ago,
[I]f. . . ‘c’ is a name for Scott, then the proposition [expressed by
Scott is c] will become simply a tautology. It is at once obvious
that if ‘c’ were ‘Scott’ itself, ‘Scott is Scott’ is just a tautology. But
if you take any other name which is just a name for Scott, then
if the name is being used as a name and not as a description, the
proposition will still be a tautology.
(1953, p. 245.)
Since ‘Hesperus’, ‘Phosphorus’ are ‘just’ two names for o, ‘Phosphorus’
is semantically indistinguishable from ‘Hesperus’ and, as it were, evapo-
rates during the transition from sentence to proposition. Any vocabulary that
already boasts ‘Hesperus’ renders ‘Phosphorus’ redundant, and vice versa.
(And a vocabulary containing ‘Venus’ makes both redundant.) But then, how
is the direct reference theorist to conceptualize the non-trivial snippet of in-
formation that you picked up in astronomy class and could not have learnt
either in linguistics or logic class?
Bealer investigates a series of options available to direct reference theory,
turning them down one after the other. The last option is announced as
being ‘quite natural’ and ‘the most promising’ one available to direct ref-
erence theory (id., p. 590)  only to be buried seconds later as suffering
from ‘a fatal aw’ (id., p. 591). The hoped-for benet to be reaped from
this option is that the following two claims should turn out to be compatible.
(a) Yes, (**) is the trivially true proposition expressed both by Hesperus
= Hesperus and Hesperus = Phosphorus; (b) but what you learnt in as-
tronomy class was (**) under one mode of presentation though not under
another.2 This cohabitation strategy seeks to bring together under one hat a
literal falsehood (namely, that the proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus is
distinct from the proposition that Hesperus is Phosphorus) and a pragmati-
cally conveyed truth (namely, that you may learn this one proposition under
one presentation without learning it under another).3
2 See Richard (1990, pp. 136ff) for an elaboration of this point within the confines of
direct reference theory.
3 See Bealer (id., §II).
05jespersen_zouhar
2011/12/6
page 492
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
i
492 BJØRN JESPERSEN AND MARIÁN ZOUHAR
How are we to express, in exact terms, this truth that is pragmatically con-
veyed in a way that is literally false? Bealer’s answer, on behalf of direct
reference theory, is this:
Suppose that m is a mode of presentation similar to ‘Hesperus =
Hesperus’ and m′, a mode of presentation similar to ‘Hesperus =
Phosphorus’. The proposal is to . . . treat ‘Under modes of presenta-
tion m and m′, respectively,’ as a kind of sentential operator Um,m′
that operates on ordinary identity and nonidentity sentences. In con-
versation, then, when one utters [the proposition that Hesperus =
Hesperus and the proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus are not
identical], which is literally false. . . , the true thing one would be
saying conversationally would be:
Under modes of presentation m and m′, respectively, the
proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus and the proposition
that Hesperus = Phosphorus are not identical. (Id., p. 590.)
The introduction of modes of presentation is to no avail, however. Bealer’s
reductio is to the effect that the introduction of two different such presen-
tations does not preserve from inconsistency the proposition that the propo-
sition expressed by Hesperus = Hesperus is distinct from the proposition
expressed by Hesperus = Phosphorus. The reductio, in Bealer’s own no-
tation, is this:
(i) Um,m′([H = H] 6= [H = P ])
(ii) q = [H = H] ∧ q = [H = P ]
(iii) Um,m′(q 6= q).
(i) is supposed to be the literal truth, Under modes of presentation m and
m′, respectively, the proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus and the propo-
sition that Hesperus = Phosphorus are not identical conversationally con-
veyed by the literal falsehood, The proposition that Hesperus = Hesperus is
distinct from the proposition that Hesperus = Phosphorus. (ii) introduces
‘q’; via substitution of ‘q’ for [H = H] and [H = P ] in the context
Um,m′(. . .), the inconsistency Um,m′(q 6= q) ensues in (iii). The va-
lidity of the substitution presupposes that Um,m′ be an extensional operator,
and Bealer in effect introduces it as such (id., p. 591, n. 29). Since we cannot
blame the inference of (iii) either on the (tacit) rule of substitution or on the
innocuous premise (ii), the culprit must be premise (i), which is therefore
unmasked as being false.
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Bealer goes on to heap scorn on (iii):
But I really do not understand what this is supposed to be saying!
. . . What relevant action of . . . Um,m′ could possibly turn ‘q 6= q’
into a true sentence . . . ? I just do not get it. (Id., p. 591.)
However, we need not rack our brains about how to make sense of Um,m′
(q 6= q). (iii) is false, for sure, but so is (i), if (ii) is true; and (ii) is an
unproblematic triviality given how direct reference theory construes names
and propositions. Since (ii) is trivially true, (i) can be no other proposition
than (iii), despite the fact that it is encoded in two syntactically different
manners. From this it follows that (iii) means whatever (i) means, and Bealer
just told us in the quotation above what (i) means. It also follows that (i),
(ii), (iii) is a trivially valid argument in which the conclusion is identical to
the rst premise.
2. First Objection
What drives the reductio is the fact that Bealer uses two (in fact, three) pieces
of notation for one and the same proposition: ‘[H = H]’, ‘[H = P ]’ (and
‘q’). But we are allowed, in logical syntax, to discard all redundant notation.
So (i) can be rewritten in several manners, including:
(i.i) Um[H = H] 6= Um′ [H = H]
(i.ii) Um[P = P ] 6= Um′ [P = P ]
(i.iii) Umq 6= Um′q.
(i.iv) Um[o = o] 6= Um′ [o = o].
We nd it more perspicuous if ‘Um’, ‘Um′’ are prexed directly to the sen-
tences they operate on. (i.i) and (i.ii) render (ii) (which merely serves to
introduce ‘q’ to blot out the notational difference between [H = H] and
[H = P ]) superuous. From (i.i), (i.i) follows: similarly for (i.ii), (i.iii),
(i.iv), respectively. This fact is blurred in Bealer’s argument by employing
two different notational guises. The use of different notational guises for the
same proposition is essential to Bealer’s argument, however, because other-
wise (i), (ii), (iii) would collapse into (i.i), (i.i) or (i.ii), (i.ii) or (i.iii), (i.iii)
or (i.iv), (i.iv). Amidst such a collapse, nobody in their right mind would
regard the rst premise as true.
It is illustrative to rewrite Bealer’s reductio using the same symbol, ‘q’, for
(**), as in:
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(i.iii) Umq 6= Um′q
(ii.i) q = q ∧ q = q
(iii.i) Umq 6= Um′q
Evidently, (i.iii) is self-contradictory, (i.iii) and (ii.i) are mutually incompat-
ible, and (iii.i) is identical to (i.iii). We may leave out (ii.i), since it is the
triviality that q is identical to itself. The identity between the premise (i.iii)
and the conclusion (iii.i) explains why the argument is trivially valid, being
an instance of self-implication.
It is revealing, therefore, that Um,m′ is explicitly introduced as a senten-
tial operator rather than a propositional one. Its operands [H = H] and
[H = P ] are distinct sentences (sentence types), so the inconsistency
Um,m′ [H = H] 6= [H = P ] cannot be read off of the notation; (ii),
together with substitution, is needed to engender the explicit, or ‘formal’,
inconsistency Um,m′(q 6= q). On the other hand, if Um,m′ were replaced
by some propositional operator U ∗m,m′ , the same operand would occur twice
over (once as governed by U ∗m and once by U ∗m′) and the ‘relevant action’
of U∗m,m′ would be immune to differences in notation. To be sure, the in-
consistency would not spring from the page, in case two different formulae
were employed. But once it was realised that the formulae co-denote, or co-
express, the same proposition, the inconsistency would be obvious, and (ii)
and substitution would not be needed.
Bealer’s argument is formally an impeccable reductio, albeit an extreme one
in which a self-contradictory proposition occurs both as premise and con-
clusion. We may well wonder, though, what the point might possibly be of
putting forward an argument of the form
A1, . . . , An
Ai
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
This question takes us to the dialectics that Bealer’s argument is embedded
in. The rst step of Bealer’s argumentation is to convince the friends of
direct reference that premise (i) is the best formal interpretation of identity
sentences available to their theory. The second step is to show that (i) con-
joined with the remaining premises entails an inconsistency. The third, and
last, step is to reject (i) on the basis of this reductio, having as a consequence
that direct reference theory is left without a theory of identity sentences.
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The problematic step is the rst one, because we are supposed to embrace an
inconsistency. The second step is trivial due to self-implication. The third
step is automatic, as soon as we accept reductio ad absurdum as a valid man-
ner of reasoning. So let us concentrate on the rst step. As we noted above,
Bealer attempts to make the premise look palatable by dressing it up in a
notation that both conceals the inconsistency and appears to be an adequate
translation into logical notation of a formulation in English of the allegedly
best theory of identity sentences available to direct reference theory. Bealer
deploys a different notation for the same proposition when guring as con-
clusion because, as said above, the inconsistency now needs to be explicit.
However, the direct-reference camp can easily blunt the impact of the re-
ductio. The formula, Um,m′([H = H]) 6= [H = P ]) can be read in no
other way but as equivalent to, Um,m′([H = H]) 6= [H = H]), on the
direct-reference interpretation of ‘H’, ‘P ’ as two names for the same indi-
vidual. So the formula is inconsistent. But it is hard to take it seriously that
the formula, so understood, could possibly be the literal truth conveyed by
some literal falsehood. Therefore, the direct-reference camp has no reason
to accept, Um,m′([H = H]) 6= [H = P ]) as an adequate interpretation
and formalization of their stance. In fact, its inconsistency gives them the
strongest possible reason for rejecting it.
Bealer would have had a much stronger case against direct reference theory
if the interpretation of true identity sentences that he attributes to the theory
had been instead a consistent proposition which together with other consis-
tent propositions issued in an inconsistency. This would have demonstrated
that a set of tenets belonging to direct reference theory, whilst individually
plausible, was inconsistent and that at least one of the tenets would have to
go.
3. Second Objection
To preview our second objection: if Um,m′ is construed as a sentential oper-
ator, it must generate opaque contexts; and, conversely, if Um,m′ is supposed
to generate transparent contexts, then it cannot be a sentential operator.
Bealer would like to treat Um,m′ as being a sentential as well as an exten-
sional operator. What our rst objection demonstrates is that if Um,m′ is
viewed as operating on sentential arguments, then points made about the
sentences it governs may be surreptitiously carried over to the propositions
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expressed or denoted by these sentences. This is, of course, both mislead-
ing and inappropriate. Yet Bealer’s reductio trades heavily precisely on this
confusion between sentences (formulae) and propositions.
What about the purported extensionality of Um,m′? Bealer is pretty much
content to merely assume his dummy operator to be extensional. What he
does offer by way of argument is condensed into a brief footnote:
Does Um,m′ generate a referentially opaque context? No, not ac-
cording to direct reference theories: the reference of a proper name
occurring in an otherwise opaque context is, strictly and literally,
never opaque but instead is always ‘direct’. (Id., p. 591, n. 29.)
This argument is weak. It confuses the semantic issue of the reference rela-
tion of directly referring terms with the pragmatic and epistemological issue
of a language-user’s command of a term as it occurs in this or that sort of
context. The opposite of being direct is being mediated, not: being opaque;
the opposite of being opaque is being transparent, not: being direct. The ref-
erence relation of a directly referring term is not torn between being opaque
or being direct, for it is obviously the latter, since for want of alternative
referents reference shift is not an option. What is an option is that, while a
directly referring term’s reference relation remains unscathed, a language-
user may lose track of what the term’s referent is. This is the notion of
opacity that suits Bealer’s purposes, as we show below.
In general, there are various ways of construing the opacity of contexts.
There are Frege-like approaches according to which opacity-inducing op-
erators shift the reference of expressions occurring within their scope. This
is a logical or semantic notion of opacity. Obviously, this notion is not an
option for the proponents of direct reference theory and, therefore, would
be futile had Bealer invoked it in his critique. On the other hand, linguistic
contexts are sometimes treated as being opaque in case a competent speaker
of a given language declines to accept a substitution of co-referential terms
in such contexts, because he fails to realize that they are co-referential. This
is a pragmatic or epistemological notion of opacity, pivoted as it is on the
speaker’s assent to or dissent from substitution. If Bealer’s argument is to
bear on direct reference theory, this is the notion of opacity he wants. This
notion does not require reference shift on the part of expressions occurring
in the contexts governed by this sort of opacity-generating operators. So
this notion of opacity is open to the proponents of direct reference theory.
It just points to something fairly simple, namely that a competent speaker
of a given language need not be in a position to ‘see behind’ the term and
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grasp what the term refers to in some particular kind(s) of context. A term
can be directly referring, while at the same time some contexts may generate
opacity in this pragmatic and epistemological sense.
Of course, the advocate of direct reference theory deciding to adopt this no-
tion of opacity has to explain how it is possible that a speaker of a given
language may at the same time qualify as competent and be entitled to dis-
sent from the substitution of co-referential terms within such contexts. Here
is a sketch of a possible answer available to direct reference theory. By ‘be-
ing a competent speaker with respect to ‘Hesperus is meant that the speaker
grasps the ‘disquotational’ sentence ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus.4 Sim-
ilarly, we have such disquotational sentences at our disposal for all proper
names, and we may admit that a speaker is competent as soon as he grasps
and accepts them as guiding his usage of the relevant proper names.
It is important to realize that the speaker may, without infringing his com-
petence with respect to ‘Hesperus’, fail to grasp the sentence ‘Hesperus’
refers to Phosphorus. The reason is because ‘Hesperus’ refers to Phos-
phorus is not homophonic. What we need are homophonic disquotational
sentences because such sentences embed the semantic conventions regulat-
ing a given name without assuming that the speaker knows, for example, all
names synonymous with it. (For the sake of argument, ‘Hesperus’ is treated
as being synonymous with ‘Phosphorus’). In this sense the speaker is im-
perfect in a vast number of cases. Had the speaker been perfect, mastering
all the synonyms of a name he does master, he could not master ‘Hespe-
rus’ refers to Hesperus without, ipso facto, mastering ‘Hesperus’ refers
to Phosphorus.5 The sentence ‘Hesperus’ refers to Hesperus captures, in
the meta-language, the piece of information the speaker has about the object-
language name ‘Hesperus’. What we claim is that the speaker is competent,
as soon as he is capable of applying disquotation; that is, he must know that
the name referred to by the left-hand term Hesperus refers to the object
referred to by the right-hand term ‘Hesperus’. He need not know that the
former refers to the object referred to by the term ‘Phosphorus’. Put differ-
ently, you may be competent (knowing that ‘a’ refers to a) without being
perfect (not knowing that ‘b’ denotes a, for any ‘b’ co-referential, or even
synonymous, with ‘a’). Just for the record, it follows from linguistic compe-
tence being couched in terms of homophonic disquotational sentences that
4 Disquotational sentences of this kind are deployed in McDowell (1977).
5 Perfect speakers are theoretical idealizations of a sort; therefore, they can be also la-
belled ‘ideal speakers’. See Zouhar (2010) for an attempt to motivate and develop a more
elaborate notion of a perfect (i.e., ideal) speaker.
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the inverse case  mastering ‘b’ refers to a without mastering ‘a’ refers
to a  is not compatible with possessing linguistic competence with re-
spect to ‘a’.
It might be objected that the recourse to homophonic disquotational sen-
tences trivializes the notion of linguistic competence. It does not, though.
First of all, homophonic disquotational sentences indicate, inter alia, also
the kind of relation the term named on the left-hand side bears to the object
named on the right-hand side. The term ‘Hesperus’ is presented as referring
to the object Hesperus. So it seems that the speaker, in mastering ‘Hespe-
rus’ refers to Hesperus, knows also that he knows that ‘Hesperus’ is a proper
name and knows also what kind of semantic relation is involved. This notion
of linguistic competence is compatible with direct reference theory and tal-
lies neatly with the notion of opacity that it would be reasonable for Bealer
to attribute to the theory when setting up his reductio.
Back to Bealer’s mode-of-presentation operator. Here is a simple argument
for viewing the sentential operator Um,m′ as opacity-generating. A standard
criterion enables us to decide whether an operator generates opaque contexts
or not: an operator generates opaque contexts, provided it does not enable
substitution of co-referential terms within these contexts salva veritate. And
it is usually assumed that a competent speaker of a given language is qual-
ied to decide whether substitution along these lines is valid. Modes of
presentation are used here to capture a speaker’s perspective on a given sen-
tence. So, let us imagine a competent speaker and ask whether it is possible
for him to dissent from replacing ‘Phosphorus’ for an occurrence of ‘Hespe-
rus’ in the sentence
Um (Hesperus = Hesperus)
where Um is a sentential operator capturing a particular perspective of the
speaker on the sentence Hesperus = Hesperus. Now assume the speaker
to be competent with respect both to ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’; this as-
sumption means that he is capable of using these terms in various utterances
in various contexts and of understanding others’ utterances in various con-
texts as well. Yet we may consistently assume that he is not willing to assent
to the suggested substitution, because his assent would require more than
mere linguistic knowledge of the relevant semantic conventions. The ad-
ditional requirement is that the speaker should possess enough astronomic
knowledge to know that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This means that while as-
senting to the sentence
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Um (Hesperus = Hesperus)
he may dissent from the sentence
Um′ (Hesperus = Phosphorus).
While the direct reference theorist may rationally defend this position, he
needs to provide a persuasive epistemology of natural language in order to
provide a modus vivendi allowing directly referring terms to co-exist with at
least some contexts being opaque. We are just trying to demonstrate here that
one should carefully distinguish the referential relation between terms and
objects from speakers’ knowledge of the referential relations of such terms.
Bealer’s argument for the opacity of Um,m′ , on the other hand, ignores this
difference, which is why we deem his argument for treating Um,m′ as gener-
ating referentially transparent contexts dubious.
Thus, it is reasonable to regard Um, as well as Um,m′ , as opacity-generating
operators, provided they govern sentences. The reason is that it is possi-
ble for a speaker to dissent from substituting co-referential terms within the
contexts prexed by Um. For Um directs the speaker’s attention to the words
occurring after this operator rather than to their meaning or reference.
Now, things would be different had Um, and Um,m′ , instead directed the
speaker’s attention to the meanings or references of the words occurring
within the scope of the operator. Given that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’
refer to the same object, o, it would be impossible for the speaker to reject
substituting one term for the other within the contexts governed by Um so
construed, because the terms are semantically indistinguishable. The speaker
would be in the same epistemic position when faced with the proposition
Um (Hesperus = Hesperus)
as when faced with the proposition
Um (Hesperus = Phosphorus).
The language-user would view Um as applying to the singular proposition
<=, o, o >, which involves the identity relation and two occurrences of the
same object.
Of course, this would mean that Um would no longer be a sentential op-
erator but a propositional one, i.e. the operator U ∗m introduced in the pre-
vious section. Hence, in order to accommodate transparency as required
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by Bealer’s reductio, one has to treat the mode-of-presentation operators as
propositional. On the other hand, if such operators are to be sentential, as is
also required by Bealer’s reductio, they need to generate opacity in order to
be relevantly different from their propositional counterparts, which generate
transparency.
The lesson is simple. Um,m′ , in its capacity as opacity-generating operator,
cannot be used by Bealer to develop his reductio. His reductio requires sub-
stituting co-referential terms  in particular, terms referring to propositions
 salva veritate. However, the opacity-generating operators cannot guaran-
tee the salva veritate clause, so Bealer’s argument comes out invalid.
Therefore, Bealer can be nailed to a dilemma. If his dummy operator Um,m′
governs transparent contexts then his argument comes out a trivially valid
reductio attributing an inconsistent interpretation of identity sentences to di-
rect reference theory that the theory has every reason to reject. If Um,m′
governs opaque contexts then the substitution that the reductio requires does
not go through, hence his argument comes out invalid, hence is no reductio
of how direct reference theory analyses identity sentences. The dilemma for
Bealer is, rst, that his reductio requires modes of presentation, yet modes of
presentation are orthogonal to direct reference; and, second, that his reductio
requires Um,m′ to generate transparency, yet a mode-of-presentation opera-
tor ought obviously to generate opacity for co-referential terms. Bealer’s
reductio compels him to choose the two less plausible horns, so his Um,m′
is, as it were, doubly implausible. The upshot is that Bealer does not have
much of a case, or any at all, against direct reference theory.
Conclusion
Above we presented two objections to Bealer’s argument. If the rst ob-
jection applies, Bealer’s argument turns out to be a trivially valid reductio
whose conclusion is identical to its only premise and, therefore, incapable
of refuting the premise. If the second objection applies, Bealer’s argument
turns out to be invalid and, therefore, cannot sustain a reductio.
Whichever objection applies, it would seem that Bealer, in effect, sets up
a straw man and sets him ablaze instead of tackling direct reference theory
head-on. This impression is conrmed by Bealer’s introduction of the mode-
of-presentation operator Um,m′ that gures in the syntax of the premise de-
signed to reproduce Bealer’s interpretation of how direct reference theory
analyses identity sentences. The very idea, though, of having modes of pre-
sentation, in whatever shape or form, be part and parcel of the syntax and
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semantics of direct reference theory is barely coherent. The theory does not
necessarily eschew modes of presentation, but direct reference does not get
analysed in terms of them.
We see Bealer’s reductio, and the use he makes of it, as a provocation rather
than as an actual confutation of direct reference theory’s (best) theory of
identity sentences. This is not to say that the provocation would not be ap-
propriate, though: it is. Direct reference theory does owe itself and the rest
of the community of analytic philosophy of language a spelt-out theory of
such sentences that suffers none of the drawbacks Bealer rightly points out
in (2004).
The most important step in that direction would consist in developing a full-
edged theory of sentential meaning to explain how the atoms (such as Venus
and the identity relation, or the King of France and baldness) that directly
referring terms pick out cooperate so as to form molecules like sentential
meanings. However, the problem of how several atoms form one compound
is nothing other than Russell’s old problem of propositional unity, which
is fundamentally the problem of the logic and semantics of predication, as
when predicating identity of Hesperus and Phosphorus or baldness of the
King of France.6 So what is hampering the progress of direct reference the-
ory would seem to be not least its lack of a satisfactory theory of predication,
hence of propositions or sentential meaning in general.7 ,8
Bjłrn Jespersen: Czech Academy of Sciences
Technical University of Ostrava
Czech Republic
6 As Davidson rightly states, “Clearly, what the problem of predication is concerned with
is none other than an example of what is often called the unity of the proposition.” (2005,
p. 87.) See (ibid., Chs. 4–5) for discussion of predication and propositional unity. For an
anti-Russellian, pro-Frege-Churchian account of predication, see Duží et al. (2010, pp. 190–
200).
7 Those advocates of direct reference that embrace propositions at all tend to construe
them in terms of ordered n-tuples. See Bealer (1998, pp. 4–10) or Jespersen (2003) for a
critique of propositions as mere set-theoretic sequences. See Pelham and Urquhart (1991)
for a critique of the widespread, but erronous, sequence-based interpretation of Russellian
propositions and an alternative interpretation.
8 Versions of this paper were read at Central European University, Budapest, 18 May
2006, and at VAF 2009, Tilburg, 22–23 January 2009. We are indebted to Marie Duží
and Pavel Materna for valuable comments. The research reported herein was in part
supported by GACR Grant #401/10/0792 (Bjørn Jespersen) and VEGA Grant #1/0046/11
(Marián Zouhar).
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